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Abstract
The Zaklan model had been proposed and studied recently using
the equilibrium Ising model on Square Lattices (SL) by Zaklan et al
(2008), near the critica temperature of the Ising model presenting a
well-defined phase transition; but on normal and modified Apollonian
networks (ANs), Andrade et al. (2005, 2009) studied the equilibrium
Ising model. They showed the equilibrium Ising model not to present
on ANs a phase transition of the type for the 2D Ising model. Here, us-
ing agent-based Monte-Carlo simulations, we study the Zaklan model
with the well-known majority-vote model (MVM) with noise and ap-
ply it to tax evasion on ANs, to show that differently from the Ising
model the MVM on ANs presents a well defined phase transition. To
control the tax evasion in the economics model proposed by Zaklan et
al, MVM is applied in the neighborhood of the critical noise qc to the
Zaklan model. Here we show that the Zaklan model is robust because
this can be studied besides using equilibrium dynamics of Ising model
also through the nonequilibrium MVM and on various topologies giv-
ing the same behavior regardless of dynamic or topology used here.
Keywords: Opinion dynamics, Sociophysics, Majority vote, Nonequi-
librium.
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1 Introduction
The Ising model [1, 2] has become a excellent tool to study other models
of social application. Therefore, following this line of reasoning the Zaklan
model had been proposed and studied recently using the equilibrium Ising
model on square Lattices by Zaklan et al. [3, 4, 12]. Lima [13], based on
Grinstein et al. [5], made a proposal to extend the current model (Zak-
lan’s model) to nonequilibrium systems, using nonequilibrium Majority-Vote
Model (MVM) [6] in order to make Zaklan’s model more realistic, because
tax evasion is nonequilibrium.
Our simulation is based on the well-known Apollonian packing introduc-
ing Apollonian networks [7]. According to Andrade et al. [7] the ANs are
simultaneously scale-free [8], small-world [9], Euclidean, space filling, and
with matching graphs [10]. Therefore, the ANs have social connections that
are often similar to scale-free or small-world networks [11] and have been
studied e.g. for the Ising model and a magnetic model [15, 16]. The ANs
here are defined and described in detail in the pioneering work by Andrade
et al. [7].
As shown in [7, 15, 16, 17] on ANs, the Ising and Potts models do not
present a phase transition. Therefore, the Ising model on this topology is not
useful for the Zaklan model, because it does not have a phase transitions on
ANs. Therefore, our work is not only to show that the Zaklan model works
another a topology as the ANs, but also to show that in some topologies the
traditional equilibrium spin models, as the Ising model, are not appropriate
to study socio-economic models as the model proposed by Zaklan et al [3,
4]. Therefore, different from Ising models, the nonequilibrium MVM model
is presented here as an alternative model in the study of socio-economic
Zaklan model on ANs. This similar behavior was also shown by Sumour et
al [18] and Lima and Stauffer [19], where the Ising model do not present a
phase transition on directed Baba´si-Albert networks and hypercubic lattices,
respectively. Thus, we present an alternative proposed in the study of social
and economics models via nonequilibrium MVM and also showed that in this
case the criterion of Grinstein et al. [5] is not applicable, i.e, on ANs Ising
and MVM do not belong to the same universality class.
Our paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we present the Zaklan
model evolving with dynamics of MVM. In section 3 we make an analysis
of tax evasion dynamics with the Zaklan model on ANs, using MVM for
their temporal evolution under different enforcement regimes; we discuss the
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results obtained. In section 4 we show that MVM also is capable to control
the different levels of the tax evasion analysed in section 3, as it was made
by Zaklan et al. [4] using Ising models. We use the enforcement mechanism
cited above on ANs and discuss the resulting tax evasion dynamics. Finally
in section 5 we present our conclusions about the study of the Zaklan model
using MVM on ANs.
2 Zaklan model and evolution dynamics
2.1 Zaklan model
The Zaklan model [3] consists of agents located on a regular or irregular
structure. Each agent is represented by an individual spin Si = ±1, who
can either be an honest tax payer +1 or a cheater −1. Initially everybody
is assumed honest. In each iteration individuals can rethink their behaviour
and have the opportunity to become the opposite type of agent they were
in the previous period. Each agent’s environment may prefer tax evasion or
reject it. The agent depends on two factors: First, the agent’s environment
exerts influence on the agent in the next period. Second, people’s decisions
are partly autonomous, independent of their environment, This autonomous
part is responsible for the emergence of tax evasion, because some initially
honest tax payers decide to evade taxes and then exert influence on others to
do so as well. Tax evaders have the greatest influence to turn honest citizens
into tax evaders if they constitute a majority in the respective neighbourhood.
On the other hand, if most people in the vicinity are honest, the respective
individual is likely to become a tax payer if (s)he was a tax evader before.
The model also presents an enforcement mechanism that consists of two
components: a probability of an efficient audit p. If tax evasion is detected,
the individual must remain honest for a number k of periods to be specified.
One iteration is one sweep through the entire lattice. The temporal evolution
this model can be performed by using an equilibrium or, in the present work,
by nonequilibrium dynamics.
2.2 Zaklan model via nonequilibrium MVM model
The Apollonian networks contain N = 3+ (3n−1− 1)/2 nodes (sites, agents,
spins) where n is the generation number [15]. Our MVM dynamics contains
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a noise parameter q. For the case of four neighbors and q = 0, if three or
four neighbors disagree with the central site, the center flips; if one or none
disagrees, the center does not flip; if two agree and two disagree, it flips
with probability 1/2. If q > 0 the center may disobey this majority rule.
More precisely, in each time period the system evolves by a single spin-flip
dynamics with a probability w given by
w(σi) =
1
2
[
1− (1− 2q)σiS
( ki∑
δ=1
σi,δ
)]
, (1)
where S(x) is the sign ±1 of x if x 6= 0, S(x) = 0 if x = 0, and the
summation runs over all ki nearest-neighbour sites σi,δ of σi. In this model
an agent assumes the value ±1 depending on the opinion of the majority of
its neighbors. The noise parameter q plays the role of the temperature in
equilibrium systems and measures the probability of aligning σi antiparallel
to the majority of its neighbors σi,δ.
3 Controlling the tax evasion dynamics
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Figure 1: Reciprocal logarithm of the relaxation times on ANs for versus q.
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In order to test if there is a phase transition in MVM models on ANs, we
measured the relaxation time τ as a funtion of the noise parameter q, indepen-
dent of our tax question. We start the system with all spins up and a number
N of spins equal to 7, 174, 456 (n = 16). We determine the time τ after which
the magnetisation
∑
i σi has flipped its sign for the first time, and then take
the median value of nine samples. As one can see in Fig. 1, the relaxation
time goes to infinity at some positive q value near 0.18, indicating a second
order phase transtion. On contrast, the Ising model on ANs [15, 16] and
directed BA networks has no phase transition and agrees with the modified
Arrhenius law for relaxation time [18]. In order to improve earlier affirmation
the magnetisation and susceptibility for N = 3, 283; 9, 844; 29, 527; 88, 576,
and 265, 723 sites and with n = 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 generation are plotted in
Fig. 2 [20].
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Figure 2: Plot of the magnetisation (a) and susceptibility (b) for different
generations of the Apollonian Network,(circle) G8, (square) G9, (star) G10,
(triangle up) G11, (triangle down) G12. The number after G gives the gen-
eration number n.
In order to calculate the rate of tax evaders, we use
tax evasion =
[N −Nhonest]
N
, (2)
where N is the total number and Nhonest the honest number of agents. The
tax evasion is calculated at every time step t of system evolution; one time
step is one sweep through the entire network.
Here, we follow the same steps we did in a previous work [13]. Therefore,
we first will present the baseline case k = 0 and p = 0.0%, i.e., no use of
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enforcement, at q = 0.80qc and with N = 367 (n = 7) sites for ANs. All
simulation are performed over 25, 000 time steps, as shown in Fig. 3. For
very low noise the part of autonomous decisions almost completely disap-
pears. The individuals then base their decision solely on what most of their
neighbours do. A rising noise has the opposite effect. Individuals then decide
more autonomously. Therefore, Figure 3 was expanded to four examples, in
order to show how much the results differ if one changes the random num-
bers. Error bars cannot describe this randomness properly. (For the later
figures the error bars are visible from the fluctuations in time which show a
band of fractions.) Although everybody is honest initially, it is impossible to
predict roughly which level of tax compliance will be reached at some time
step in the future.
For MVM it is known that for q > qc, half of the people are honest and
the other half cheat, while for q < qc either one opinion or the other opinion
dominates. Because of this behavior we set at fixed ”Social Temperature”
(q) to some values slightly below qc, where the case that agents distribute
in equal proportions onto the two alternatives is excluded. Then having set
the noise parameter q close to qc ≃ 0.18 on the ANs, we vary the degrees
of punishment (k = 1, 10 and 50) and audit probability rate (p = 0.5%,
10% and 90%). Therefore, if tax evasion is detected by the enforcement
mechanism p, the period of punishment k is triggered in order to control
the tax evasion level. The punished individuals remain honest for a certain
number k of periods, as explained before in section 2.
Figure 4 illustrates different simulation settings for ANs, for each con-
sidered combination of degree of punishment (k = 1, 10 and 50) and audit
probability (p = 0.5%, 10% and 90%), where the tax evasion is plotted over
25, 000 time steps. Both a rise in audit probability (greater p) and a higher
penalty (greater k) work to flatten the time series of tax evasion and to shift
the band of possible non-compliance values towards more compliance. How-
ever, the simulations show that even extreme enforcement measures (p = 90%
and k = 50) cannot fully solve the problem of tax evasion.
In Fig. 5 we plot tax evasion for ANs, but now with N = 3, 283, again
for different enforcement k and audit probability p. Now the fluctuations
are much smaller since the network is nearly nine times larger. For case (a)
we plot the baseline case k = 0 and p = 0, i.e., no use of enforcement for
ANs and parameters as in Fig. 3. The probable error for part (c) fluctuates
near 0.0031 and is much smaller than the symbols (circle). Case (b) with
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Figure 3: Baseline case:k = p = 0 and with three different seed (a), (b), (c)
and the average over twenty different seeds (d). We use q = 0.80qc on ANs
and perform all simulations over 25, 000 time steps, also in the later figures.
k = 1, p = 0.5% shows already a strong reduction of tax evasion. In case (c)
we show the tax evasion level decreases, on ANs, for a more realistic set of
possible values degrees of punishment k = 10 and audit probability p = 4.5%
[14, 3]. In case (d) we also show the tax evasion level decreases much more
for an extreme set of punishment k = 50 and audit probability p = 90% [3].
Therefore, our model also works for large networks.
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Figure 4: Tax evasion for different enforcement regimes ANs and for degrees
of punishment k = 0, 1, 10 and 50 and audit probability p = 0.5%, 10% and
90%.
To understand statistical errors, in Fig. 5 we plot tax evasion for ANs
with N = 3, 283 now for the case k = 10 and p = 4.5%. We found from 20
samples in part (c) that the tax evasion remains at around 20%, but with
fluctuations in time larger than from sample to sample: The probable errors
are much smaller than the fluctuations seen in part (c).
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Figure 5: Tax evasion for different enforcement regimes ANs and for de-
grees of punishment k = 0, 1, 10 and 50 and audit probability p =
0.0%, 0.5%, 4.5%, and 90% for N = 3, 283 sites (nodes) of ANs and use
50, 000 time steps. Here, for k = 0 and p = 4.5% (c), we present the average
over twenty different seeds.
4 Conclusion
Less developed countries may have more tax evasion because of less trust
in government [14]. To study this problem Zaklan et al. [3, 4] proposed a
model, called here the Zaklan model, using Monte Carlo simulations and a
equilibrium dynamics (Ising model) on square lattices. Their results are in
good agreement with analytical and experimental results obtained by [14].
In this work we show that the Zaklan model of tax evasiom is very robust
because we use a nonequilibrium dynamics (MVM) to simulate the Zaklan
model, with results similar to equilibrium dynamics (Ising model) [3, 4],
and also on various topologies [13]. Also here we found the plausible result
that tax evasion is diminished by higher audit probability p and stronger
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punishment k.
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